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Abstract 
This paper provides more insight into the relevance of the assumption of human capital theory that the 
productivity of job-related training is driven by the improvement of workers’ skills. We analyse the 
extent to which training and informal learning on the job are related to employee skill development 
and consider the heterogeneity of this relationship with respect to workers’ skill mismatch at job entry. 
Using data from the 2014 European Skills Survey, we find – as assumed by human capital theory – 
that employees who participated in training or informal learning show greater improvement of their 
skills than those who did not. The contribution of informal learning to employee skill development 
appears to be larger than that of training participation. Nevertheless, both forms of learning are shown 
to be complementary. This complementarity between training and informal learning is related to a 
significant additional improvement of workers’ skills. The skill development of workers who were 
initially underskilled for their job seems to benefit the most from both training and informal learning, 
whereas the skill development of those who were initially overskilled benefits the least. Work-related 
learning investments in the latter group seem to be more functional in offsetting skill depreciation than 
in fostering skill accumulation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
To deal with the challenges of rising global competition, the European Union has set itself goals with 
respect to formal training and informal learning in the workplace to ‘acquire and develop new skills 
throughout the lifetime of individuals’ and increase their productivity (European Commission 
2010:16). This idea that lifelong learning improves workers’ skills builds on human capital theory 
(Mincer, 1962; Becker 1964; Ben-Porath, 1967; Heckman, 1976). Several empirical studies have 
shown that job-related training is associated with higher wages and productivity (e.g. Acemoglu & 
Pischke, 1999; Blundel et al., 1999; Leuven & Oosterbeek, 2008; Görlitz, 2011). However, due to lack 
of data on skill development, there is hardly any empirical literature on the contribution of different 
forms of human capital investments to workers’ skill development.  
In this paper, we provide more insights into the relevance of the assumption that the 
productivity of training is driven by the improvement of workers’ skills. We analyse the extent to 
which work-related learning is related to the skill development of workers in 28 European countries. 
We thereby distinguish between formal training participation and informal learning on the job and 
examine whether the substitution or complementarity between these two types of learning plays a role 
in workers’ skill accumulation. To better understand these relationships, we allow for heterogeneity 
with regard to employee skill mismatch at job entry.
1
  
The 2014 European Skills Survey shows that, at the start of a job, a significant proportion of 
the labour force in Europe has skills that either exceed the demands of their job or are insufficient for 
adequate job performance: 24 percent of all workers report that some of their skills were initially 
lower than what was required in their job, whereas 25 percent report that their skills were initially 
higher than required. In comparison with well-matched workers, those who are underskilled, on the 
one hand, probably need more training or informal learning on the job to perform at an adequate level. 
We therefore expect job-related learning to add more to these workers’ skill level. On the other hand, 
workers who are overskilled could be more likely to have other reasons to engage in job-related 
learning, such as keeping their skills up-to-date, which might not reveal skill improvement as such. 
Because of these differences in the degree of workers’ skill utilisation on the job and in the underlying 
reasons for participating in job-related learning, the skill development of initially mismatched workers 
is expected to differ from that of workers whose skills fully matched the skill demands in their job.  
For this study, we use data on more than 37,000 employees from the European Skills Survey, 
conducted in 2014 by the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop). 
This survey is one of the first in which different types of job-related learning as well as employees’ 
skill development and mismatch are measured. Although these data are not sufficient to establish 
causality, we provide relevant empirical evidence on the expected relationship between different forms 
of workplace learning and employee skill accumulation, which has, until now, been a black box in the 
                                                     
1 Since workers’ skill mismatch could improve when they participate in learning, we use information on individuals’ skill 
mismatch at the start of the job with their current employer rather than their current skill mismatch status. Hereafter, we use 
the terms underskilled, well matched, and overskilled to refer to the skill mismatch status of employees at job entry.   
3 
 
empirical human capital literature that has mainly focused on workers’ wages (De Grip & Sauermann, 
2013).  
Our study contributes to the literature in three more ways. First, whereas most empirical 
studies focus on training participation, we are able to differentiate between formal training and 
informal learning to investigate in more detail the extent to which workers’ participation in different 
forms of work-related learning contributes in the improvement of their skill levels. Second, we provide 
more insights into the complementarity between training and informal learning on the job by analysing 
their interaction in the development of workers’ skills. Third, we examine the heterogeneity of the 
relationships between training and informal learning and workers’ skill development with respect to 
the initial job–worker mismatch status.  
In line with the hypotheses derived from skills production models, we find that employees 
who participate in training or who are more often involved in informal learning show greater skill 
improvement. The relationship between informal learning on the job and employees’ skill 
development appears to be stronger than that between training participation and skill development. 
Nonetheless, there is complementarity between these two forms of work-related learning. This 
complementarity seems to favour skill development since we find that workers who participated in 
both training and informal learning show significant additional improvement of their skills. This 
finding is consistent with the notions of the complementarity and cross-productivity of human capital 
(Cunha & Heckman, 2007) in an on-the-job context. We also find that skill mismatches induce 
heterogeneities and moderate the previous outcomes. Thereby, we find that well-matched, 
underskilled, and overskilled employees differ in the extent to which investments in training and 
informal learning – and their complementarity – are associated with the accumulation of their skills 
during their working life. A stronger relationship between work-related learning and skill development 
suggests that initially underskilled employees benefit the most from both training and informal 
learning, whereas overskilled employees benefit the least. Human capital investments in the latter 
group seem to be more functional in counteracting skill depreciation and maintaining their skill level 
than in fostering skill accumulation, as suggested by literature on skill obsolescence (e.g. De Grip & 
van Loo, 2002). Our study then suggests that being employed in a skill-challenging job or a job that 
underutilises a worker’s skills has important implications on the returns to investment in both training 
and informal learning.  
We also analyse the contribution of different types of training and informal learning to 
workers’ skill development. We find that, among well-matched and underskilled employees, training 
during working hours and training paid by the employer are more strongly related to workers’ skill 
development than training outside working hours and training paid by the employee. Among 
overskilled workers, however, these differences are rather small and statistically insignificant. With 
respect to informal learning, we find that, for workers in well-matching jobs, informal learning from 
colleagues and supervisors seem to contribute to their skills as much as informal learning by trial and 
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error and self-study. Underskilled workers, however, show greater skill improvement when learning 
by self-study. In contrast, overskilled workers seem to benefit more from informal learning by trial 
and error and learning from colleagues and supervisors than from self-study, which appears to be 
insignificant for their skill improvement.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. 
Section 3 describes the dataset and the definitions of skill development and skill mismatch as well as 
the other variables used in the analyses. Section 4 describes the estimation method we use – ordered 
probit models with interaction effects – and explains how to interpret the results. The results are 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE 
2.1 Human Capital Investments and Skill Development 
Human capital theory considers on-the-job learning an investment that increases workers’ productivity 
and wages via the accumulation of skills (Mincer, 1962; Ben-Porath, 1967; Becker 1964; Heckman, 
1976). First, at the individual level, most of the empirical literature deals with the relation between 
training and wages, since hard measures of individual productivity are rare (Acemoglu & Pischke, 
1999; Blundel et al., 1999; Leuven & Oosterbeek, 2008; Görlitz, 2011; O’Connell & Byrne, 2012). An 
exception is the study of De Grip and Sauermann (2012), who assess the effects of job-related training 
on individual performance by means of a ﬁeld experiment. Second, at the firm level, most studies 
focus on the relation between average training participation and firm productivity as measured by 
value added (Bartel, 1994, 2000; Lowenstein & Spletzer, 1998; Barrett & O'Connell, 2001; Dearden et 
al., 2006; Sepulveda, 2010). However, due to lack of data, the empirical question whether training and 
informal learning affect workers’ performance by increasing workers’ skills or whether the 
performance increase is attributable to other factors still remains (De Grip & Sauermann, 2013). 
There is one exception. Green et al. (2001) analyse training on and off the job as a determinant 
of skills supply. Using the British Skills Survey, the authors find that off-the-job training is a 
determinant of all types of skills included in their analysis except team working, whereas on-the-job 
training contributes only to workers’ problem-solving and team-working skills. However, Green et al. 
(2001) measure tasks rather than skills by using information on the importance of workers’ particular 
job activities as the dependent variable. Furthermore, their skills measure refers only to one point in 
time, which does not allow for analysing workers’ skill development over time. Moreover, due to lack 
of data, the authors cannot explore the contribution of informal learning to skill formation.  
One of the main tenets of our paper is that the skills individuals can accumulate by learning on 
the job are acquired not only by formal training but also by informal learning. Early support for this 
idea can be found in Mincer (1974), who claimed that on-the-job informal learning probably 
constitutes the essential part and the major human capital investment in the workplace. Empirical 
studies such as those of Levitt et al. (2012) and Destré et al. (2008) have, respectively, shown that 
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learning by doing and learning from others are significantly important in explaining workers’ earnings 
and firm productivity. However, due to data limitations and the assumption in standard models that 
experience absorbs the work-related learning effect, there is hardly any empirical evidence that 
informal learning on the job is positively related to workers’ skill improvement or productivity.  
Last but not least, human capital literature indicates that there could be direct complementarity 
and cross-productivity (Carneiro & Heckman, 2003; Cunha & Heckman, 2007) between training and 
informal learning investments in the workplace. If training participation encourages informal learning 
and vice versa, investments in one type of learning could raise the marginal productivity of 
investments in the other type, in terms of skill accumulation. That is, skills acquired by training and 
informal learning could boost each other and thus further reinforce the skill development of workers 
who participate in both types of work-related learning. In our study, we explore the probability of such 
complementarity and cross-productivity of work-related training playing a part in the skill 
development of European employees. Hence, the availability of measures of training participation and 
informal learning as well as skill changes enables us, to some extent, to open the black box in the 
economic literature and provide additional insight into the transfer of lifelong learning to workers’ 
skills (De Corte, 2003; De Grip & Sauermann, 2013).  
 
2.2 Skill mismatch and Human Capital Investment  
Research on job mismatch concentrates mostly on the wage outcomes of overeducation (see Groot, 
1996; Hartog, 2000; Chevalier, 2003; Di Pietro & Urwin, 2006; McGuinness, 2006; Dolton & Silles, 
2008). More recently, the literature has exhibited a shift in emphasis from overeducation to skill 
mismatch (see Chevalier & Lindley, 2009; McGuinness & Wooden, 2009; O‘Leary et al., 2009; Green 
& Zhu, 2010; Mavromaras et al., 2010; McGuinness & Sloane, 2011; Mavromaras & McGuinness, 
2012; McGuinness & Byrne, 2014). These studies have shown that overeducation and overskilling 
refer to different phenomena and that overeducation may not fully capture the extent to which an 
individual’s skills are utilised at work. Educational attainment does not incorporate any measure of 
ability
2
 or skills acquired through employment, while job entry requirements are imprecise at 
measuring a job’s skill content. Measuring workers’ skill mismatch could solve these difficulties by 
requiring individuals to compare the actual skills requirement of their job with their own skills 
acquired by either initial education, or training, or informal learning or related to their general ability.  
On the one hand, the objective measure of educational mismatch seems statistically superior. 
However, apart from being rarely available at the necessary job level, these indicators rely on the 
symmetry in the distribution of required education along occupations, and have been shown to be 
rather poorly correlated with skill mismatches (Sloane et al. 1996; Allen & van der Velden, 2001; 
Green & McIntosh, 2007). On the other hand, self-reported measures of skill mismatch avoid the 
symmetry assumption and incorporate more than only formal education but rely on subjective 
                                                     
2 It has been argued that overeducated workers are likely of lower ability and, therefore, the wage penalty could be largely 
explained by this unobserved heterogeneity (Groot, 1996; Sloane et al., 1999). This supports the idea that employers learn 
about the productive abilities of overeducated employees and pay them lower wages. 
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assessments. Although susceptible to measurement error due to subjective bias, skill mismatch is still 
considered a more adequate and potentially more robust measure of skills underutilisation and 
overutilisation than educational mismatch is (Linsley, 2005; Mavromaras & McGuinness, 2012). 
The literature on educational and skill mismatches coexists with the empirical literature on 
wages and training; however, there has been little interaction between the two fields, despite the fact 
that on-the-job human capital investments could be a response to initial conditions of job–skill 
mismatch. Economic theory implies this connection in search and matching models in which training 
is considered a supplement to formal education in the way that it bridges the gap between generic 
skills acquired through schooling and specific skills required in the workplace (Acemoglu & Pischke, 
1999; Arulampalam et al., 2004). Consequently, training is expected to contribute to the adjustment 
between workers’ potential productivity and the productivity ceiling of the job in which they are 
employed (Blazquez & Jansen, 2008).  
Models of skill formation have also underlined that, besides skill augmentation, training also 
plays a critical role in the restoration and replenishment of human capital in the context of skill 
depreciation (Rosen, 1975; Mincer & Ofek, 1982). In this regard, empirical studies find that 
overeducated workers participate less often in training than those who are well matched, whereas 
undereducated workers participate more often (van Smoorenburg & van der Velden, 2000; Messinis & 
Olekalns, 2007). These studies have also found that training helps to close the gap between the actual 
and required education of undereducated workers through the acquisition of new skills and that 
training offsets the depreciation of the human capital of overeducated workers. Messinis and Olekalns 
(2008) find, moreover, that training participation relates to substantial wage benefits for undereducated 
workers in relation to their well-matched co-workers and enables overeducated employees to reduce 
the wage penalty associated with the mismatch. The authors also find that these wage returns to 
training are asymmetric, that is, the undereducated seem to benefit more than those with just the right 
education, while the overeducated benefit the least. 
The question whether the relationship between work-related learning and workers’ skill 
improvement differs by their initial mismatch status has not been analysed in the empirical literature. 
A mismatch between employees’ skills and the level of their jobs could have important implications 
on skill returns to investment in both training and informal learning due to several reasons. In 
comparison with workers in a well-matching job, underskilled and overskilled workers likely have 
different aims when participating in job-related learning. The former probably need more training and 
learning to perform at an adequate level in such challenging jobs, whereas the latter may be more 
likely to invest in learning to keep their skills up-to-date or to counteract skill depreciation, which 
might not reveal skill improvement per se. 
In this respect, our study relates to the literature on human capital depreciation, which has also 
explored the relation between skill mismatch and skill obsolescence. Building on the ‘use it or lose it’ 
hypothesis or the ‘atrophy’ of a worker’s skills by non-use, this literature has shown that overqualified 
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workers who are unable to fully utilise their skills in their job are less able to sustain their cognitive 
level and are, therefore, more vulnerable to experience skill decline (e.g. De Grip & van Loo, 2002; 
De Grip et al., 2008).  
If we integrate the preceding evidence on skill depreciation into the standard model of skill 
formation,
3
 the skill returns of further investments in training and informal learning are expected to 
vary with the workers’ job–skill mismatch status. A key feature of the technology of skill development 
is that skills bolster each other over the life cycle because acquired skills raise both the level and 
productivity of subsequent learning investments in a multiplier process (Cunha & Heckman, 2007). 
However, these attributes of human capital might be reduced if skills are underutilised in the job or 
increased if job skill demands are higher. Being underskilled at job entry could serve as a positive 
context, not only in raising the level of further learning investments but also in the effectiveness of 
these investments in human capital, given their initial stock of skills. Conversely, being overskilled at 
job entry could act as a negative context, not only because a worker’s initial stock of skills may 
deteriorate due to non-use, but also because this deterioration may decrease the effectiveness and 
complementarity of further learning investments in the accumulation of human capital. This is 
consistent with Cunha and Heckman’s (2007) evidence that higher initial stocks of human capital are 
not productive if they are not followed up by later investments over the life cycle.  
This notion of the skill multiplier presented by Cunha and Heckman (2007) enable us to better 
understand the interaction between work-related human capital investments and the degree of on-the-
job utilisation of the initial stock of workers’ skills. In comparison with individuals whose acquired 
skills are appropriately used in their job, those with a higher initial stock of skills than required for 
their job are expected to have greater skill multiplier potential but, at the same time, lower levels of 
investment in training and informal learning on the job. According to the technology of skill 
formation, this implies a lower complementarity of human capital investments and, therefore, a lower 
marginal productivity of later investments. Conversely, underskilled workers are expected to have a 
lower skill multiplier potential because of their lower stock of skills compared to what is required in 
their jobs. These workers could, however, show greater investments in work-related training and 
informal learning to substitute for their lack of skills needed to perform at an adequate level in their 
job, which could produce stronger complementarity between human capital investments and hence a 
higher marginal productivity of later remedial investments in training and informal learning.  
There is one more reason to expect that matched and mismatched workers differ in the extent 
to which their skill development and learning investments are related. The notion that worker 
motivation fosters a more efficient cognitive acquisition of skills suggests that, among overskilled 
workers, the productivity of training and learning on the job may be lower if they are generally less 
motivated and satisfied, as has been shown in the literature (e.g. Hersch, 1991; Verhaest & Omey, 
2009; Green & Zhu, 2010). We build on the theoretical and empirical studies discussed above to 
                                                     
3 Models on skill formation such as those in Killingsworth (1982), and Cunha and Heckman (2007) assume that skills 
acquired in one period persist into the future without any deterioration. 
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explore in more detail the heterogeneity in the relationship between work-related learning and skill 
development with regard to employees’ skill mismatch at job entry. 
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES 
3.1 Data and Sample 
We use data from the European Skills Survey, conducted in 2014 by Cedefop in 28 European 
countries. The survey was based on a representative sample of the working population aged 24–65 
years in each of the participant countries and administered either online or by telephone to 48,676 
individuals.
4
 The survey provides unique self-reported measures of employees’ changes in skill 
accumulation as well as changes in skill mismatch over years of tenure with the same employer. 
Comparable measures are not available from any other large-scale dataset. Furthermore, this survey 
provides information on both the incidence of training and the intensity of informal learning in the 
workplace, in addition to other individual, job, and employer characteristics.
5
 We restrict our analyses 
to full-time employees,
6
 obtaining a sample of 37,285 individuals. Table A1 in the Appendix shows 
the sample distribution by country.  
 
3.2 Variables and Descriptive Analyses  
Table A2 in the Appendix shows the main descriptive statistics of the variables included in our 
analyses.  
3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
Our outcome variable, workers’ skill development is based on self-assessed changes in skills7 since the 
start of their current job. It is derived from the following question:
8
  
Compared to when you started your job with your current employer, would you say 
your skills have now improved, worsened, or stayed the same? Please use a scale of 0 
to 10, where 0 means your skills have worsened a lot, 5 means they have stayed the 
same, and 10 means they have improved a lot.  
The mean reported skill development is 7.76, with a standard deviation of 1.77. As shown in Table 1, 
approximately 86 percent of the individuals in the sample reported that their skills had improved 
(scores of six to 10), whereas only 14 percent indicated that their skills had stayed the same (score of 
five) or worsened (scores of one to four).  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
                                                     
4 See Ipsos MORI (2014) for further details about data validation.  
5 This dataset has, however, some limitations for our analyses, which we discuss in Section 5.1.2 when performing robustness 
checks of our main results. 
6 We consider those who reported a minimum of 35 working hours a week full-time employees.  
7 Skills were defined in the questionnaire as ‘all of the knowledge, abilities, and competences that you have gained as part of 
your education and also during the time you have been working’. 
8 The response rate to this question was 98 percent; only 2 percent of employees stated they had current skills not comparable 
to those they had before or did not to know the answer to the question. 
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3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
First, we distinguish between two types of work-related learning: training and informal learning.  
 The variable Training is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the employee has participated 
in training courses since the start of the current job and zero otherwise. It is based on the question, 
‘Since you started your job with your current employer, have you attended training courses (work-
based, classroom-based, and online)?’ Since this question was only asked to those who reported 
having experienced positive skill development, we use the response to the question on training 
participation in the last 12 months for those whose skill declined.
9
 Table A2 of the Appendix shows 
that 62 percent of all employees in our sample participated in training courses at least once since they 
started their current job, while 57 percent did so during the last 12 months. Among the latter, we 
observe that 45 percent underwent their training mainly during working hours, while 22 percent did so 
outside working hours. For 69 percent of the workers, training was fully financed by the employer, 
whereas 12 percent financed it themselves. As shown in Figure 1, the density distribution of 
employees’ development of skills shifts to the right when workers participate in training. We also 
observe this significant difference in the mean value of the variable for skill development by training 
participation, which is 8.40 for training participants and 7.07 for non-participants. This already 
indicates a positive relation between training participation and skill development.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]  
 Informal learning is measured by a categorical variable IL derived from the question ‘How often, if 
at all, does your job involve learning new things?’ The respondent’s options were ‘never’, 
‘sometimes’, ‘usually’, or ‘always’. Table A2 of the Appendix shows that 55 percent of all the 
employees in our sample stated that they usually or always learned informally on the job, whereas 
only 4 percent said they were never involved in learning at work. Importantly, as shown in Figure 2, 
the density distribution of skill improvement is more concentrated to the right when workers are more 
often involved in informal learning. Accordingly, the mean value of the variable skill development 
also varies with the frequency of informal learning on the job. These values are 8.35 and 6.69 for 
workers who stated that they were always and never involved in informal learning while working, 
respectively. This provides first evidence that informal learning is also positively related to workers’ 
skill development. In additional analyses, we differentiate between three types of informal learning by 
including dummy variables for 1) learning from colleagues and supervisors, 2) learning by trial and 
error, and 3) learning from self-study.
10
  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here]  
                                                     
9 Training participation since the start of the job and during the last 12 months are highly positively correlated (0.67). A total 
of 81 percent of workers who answered both questions on training participation since job entry and during the last 12 months 
gave the same answer to both questions.  
10 These variables are based on the question ‘Since you started your job with your current employer, have you done any of 
the following…?’ Respondents could indicate as many of the following answers as applicable: ‘a) your supervisor taught you 
on-the-job, b) you learned by interacting with colleagues at work, c) you learned at work through trial and error, and d) you 
learned by yourself (e.g. with the aid of manuals, books, videos or on-line materials)’.  
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Second, we distinguish between workers who experienced a mismatch at the start of their current job 
and those who did not. 
 Initial job–skill mismatch status is a categorical variable that takes three different values (initially 
well matched, initially underskilled, initially overskilled) corresponding to the three possible responses 
to the following question:  
When you started your job with your current employer, overall, how would you best 
describe your skills in relation to what was required to do your job at that time? a) my 
skills were matched to what was required by my job, b) some of my skills were lower 
than what was required by my job and needed to be further developed), or c) my skills 
were higher than required by my job.  
In our sample, 51 percent of all the employees stated they had a good skills match at the start of their 
jobs, while 24 percent considered themselves initially underskilled and 25 percent considered 
themselves initially overskilled. As shown in Figure 3, the distribution of skill development differs 
between the three different groups in favour of employees who were initially underskilled. We also 
observe significant differences in the mean value of the variable for skill development by skill 
mismatch status, which is 7.78 for the well matched, 8.41 for the underskilled, and 7.15 for the 
overskilled. This descriptive evidence suggests that workers who start a job with fewer skills than 
required make the largest skills progress when gaining years of tenure.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here]  
Table A2 shows other differences between initially underskilled and overskilled workers. For those 
who were initially overskilled, a slightly higher proportion is male and higher educated. Moreover, 
these workers more often have temporary contracts and fewer years of tenure. Furthermore, the table 
shows a higher percentage of underskilled workers in manufacturing and among professionals, 
technicians, and workers in crafts and related trades. Overskilled workers are overrepresented in the 
sales and transportation industries, as well as in the service and sales, and clerical support occupations. 
It is worth mentioning that there is no difference in workers’ ages between the three skill mismatch 
groups (mean= 42, standard deviation = 9.8) or in the sizes of the firms that employ them.   
It is important to note that underskilled workers participated more often in training and formal 
education. They also stated they learned more often on an informal basis than well-matched and 
overskilled workers did. The latter invested the least in their human capital.
11
 This may not be 
surprising, since these workers already had more skills than required in their job. This suggests that 
                                                     
11 Multivariate analyses support these correlations. We find that initially underskilled workers are, on average, 6.8 percentage 
points more likely to participate in training courses, 4.8 percentage points more likely to engage in informal learning, and 
more intensively involved in informal learning than well-matched workers by approximately 0.55 of a standard deviation. 
Conversely, the initially overskilled have a lower probability of training participation (-1.4 percentage points) and a lower 
probability of taking part in informal learning (-1.6 percentage points) in comparison with workers who started in a well-
matched job. In addition, informal learning intensity is also lower among the overskilled than among well-matched workers 
by approximately 0.94 of a standard deviation (see Table A4 in the Appendix). 
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having a job that initially mismatches the skills of workers is related to participation in training as well 
as informal learning, which could influence workers’ skill development.  
3.2.3 Control variables  
We explicitly include participation in formal education – which led to a higher degree while working 
for the current employer – as a control variable in our model. This variable measures human capital 
investments in the form of schooling rather than job-related learning. Formal education is a dummy 
variable for participation in formal educational programmes resulting in a higher or different 
educational degree while working for the current employer. We construct this variable by assigning 
the value one for those who achieved their highest level of education after they started to work with 
their current employer and zero otherwise. As shown in Table A2, 14 percent of all employees in our 
sample participated in formal education while working for their current employer. Formal education 
also seems to be positively correlated to skill development, a reason to include it as a control variable.  
  As suggested by human capital theory, we additionally control for age, gender, educational 
level (low, middle, and high), tenure, type of contract (permanent, fixed-term temporary, agency 
temporary, and no formal contract), occupation (nine one-digit ISCO categories), industry (10 one-
digit ISIC categories), firm size (five categories), and country dummies. Moreover, we include 
dummies to control for major changes since the start of the job in regards to job position or job task 
content,
12
 working methods,
13
 and the need to learn new things
14
, which could affect the relationship of 
main interest in this paper. We also include a dummy variable that indicates whether the survey was 
conducted by telephone.  
 
4. ESTIMATION METHOD 
To estimate the relation between employees’ job-related learning and skill development, we use 
ordered probit models. The fact that responses to our dependent variable are concentrated in some 
categories suggests that the meaning of certain categories is more expansive than others. In this case, 
OLS estimation is likely to give misleading results (Winship & Mare, 1984; Long, 1997).  Therefore, 
we consider the self-reported measure of individuals’ skill changes as an ordinal structure in which the 
distances between the categories are unknown and allowed to be unequal.  
                                                     
12 Major changes in the job position over tenure are considered, that is, if the worker has experienced a promotion, a 
demotion, a change of unit/department, or a substantial change in the nature of job tasks. These dummy variables are derived 
from the answers to the question, ‘Since you started working for your current employer, have any of the following changes in 
your role taken place?’ The respondent’s options were: ‘a) I have been promoted to a higher level position, b) I moved to a 
different unit/department, c) I have not been promoted or moved department but the nature of my tasks and responsibilities 
has changed, d) I now have a lower-level position than when I started, and e) no changes, my role has remained the same’.   
13 These dummy variables are derived from the answers to the question ‘Since you started your main job have any of these 
changes taken place in your workplace?’ The respondent’s options taken into account were ‘a) Changes to the technologies 
you use (e.g. machinery, ICT systems) and b) changes to your working methods and practices’.  
14 This categorical variable is derived from the question ‘Has the need to learn new things increased, decreased or remained 
the same since you started your job with your current employer? Please use a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means it has decreased 
a lot, 5 means it has stayed the same and 10 means it has increased a lot’. Answers from zero to four are considered a 
decrease, whereas answers from six to 10 are considered an increase in the need of learning. Answer five is the base category.  
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(1) 
Let 𝑆𝐷𝑖 denote an observable ordinal variable coded from zero to 10 based on responses to the 
individual skill change question described in the previous section. These choices are modelled based 
on an unobservable latent continuous variable (𝑆𝐷𝑖
∗) that can be expressed as a function of a set of 
observable factors (𝑍𝑖) and unobservable factors (𝑢𝑖) using the following linear relationship:  
 
             𝑆𝐷𝑖
∗     =    𝑍𝑖
′𝛽 +  𝑢𝑖                                                           
                                              =    𝛾′𝑋𝑖 +  𝛿𝐿𝑖 + 𝜁𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑖 +  𝜓(𝐿𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑖) + 𝑢𝑖  
 
where 𝑋 is a vector of covariates composed of worker and firm characteristics along with a set of 
country dummies, L is a vector of participation in training and informal learning variables, ISM is an 
indicator of the initial job–skill match, and 𝑢𝑖∼N(0, 1). The existence of a set of K-1 ordered threshold 
parameters is also assumed, such that the individual responds with category k if and only if  
𝑆𝐷𝑖
∗𝜖 [𝜃𝑘−1,𝜃𝑘]. In general terms, we can write Prob(𝑆𝐷𝑖= k | 𝑍𝑖) = Φ(𝜃𝑘 − 𝑍𝑖
′𝛽) − Φ(𝜃𝑘−1 − 𝑍𝑖
′𝛽) 
for k = 0, … K,  where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of 𝑢𝑖 for the standard normal. 
The first and final intervals are open ended, so for k = 0, Φ(𝜃𝑘−1) = Φ(–∞) = 0 and for k = 10, Φ(𝜃𝑘) 
= Φ(+∞) = 1. The regression parameters 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜁, and 𝜓 and the K-1 threshold parameters are obtained 
by maximising the log-likelihood function subject to 𝜃𝑘 > 𝜃𝑘−1 for all k. We use a robust clustered 
estimator of variance to allow for intragroup correlation at the country level (Wooldridge, 2010). 
As described above, our analyses consider interactions between the learning variables L 
(training, informal learning, and formal education) and the employee’s initial skills match ISM. As 
Norton et al. (2004), Greene (2010), and Karaca-Mandic et al. (2011) have shown, the interpretation 
of interaction terms in linear models does not extend to nonlinear models. Basically, the interaction 
effect in nonlinear models cannot be evaluated by looking at the sign, magnitude, or statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the interaction term (Ai &Norton, 2003). For nonlinear models that 
include interactions between categorical variables as in this paper, the interaction effect becomes the 
following discrete double difference:  
 
∆2Φ(𝑍′𝛽)
∆𝐿 ∗ ∆𝐼𝑆𝑀
        =      
∆{𝛷[𝛿 +  𝜁𝐼𝑆𝑀 +  𝜓(𝐿 ∗ 𝐼𝑆𝑀) +  𝛾′𝑋] − Φ[𝜁𝐼𝑆𝑀 + 𝛾′𝑋]
∆𝐼𝑆𝑀
          
=      Φ(𝛿 + 𝜁 + 𝜓 +  𝛾′𝑋) − Φ(𝛿 + 𝛾′𝑋) −  Φ(𝜁 + 𝛾′𝑋) + Φ(𝛾′𝑋)2 
 
Some implications need to be taken into account. First, the interaction effects in nonlinear models are 
conditional on the independent variables. Second, since two additive terms can be either positive or 
negative, the interaction effects could have opposite signs for different values of covariates and, 
therefore, the sign of 𝜓 does not necessarily reflect the sign of the interaction effects. Third, even if 𝜓 
is zero, the interaction effects could be nonzero. Finally, the statistical significance tests of the 
interaction terms need to be associated with the entire double difference (Ai & Norton, 2003; Norton 
et al., 2004). Taking these implications into account, we compute and report, as suggested by Long 
and Freese (2014) and Karaca-Mandic et al. (2011), full interaction marginal effects (cross-
differences) and their statistical significance to correctly interpret our results. 
(2) 
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5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
5.1 Work-Related Learning and Skill Development 
We estimate an ordered probit regression for skill development that includes interactions between the 
work-related learning variables and the employee’s initial skills match, as described in the previous 
section. The resulting coefficients, however, are not directly interpretable (Long, 1997; Greene, 2010; 
Long & Freese, 2014). We therefore provide in Table 2 the corresponding average marginal effects 
(AMEs).
15
 To facilitate the interpretation of results, we compute AMEs in four categories: worsened 
skills (scores zero to four), no or hardly any change in skills (scores five and six), intermediate 
improvement of skills (scores seven and eight), and high improvement of skills (scores nine and 10).
16
 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
In line with expectations from human capital theory, the results in Table 2 show that both participation 
in training and informal learning are significantly and positively associated with employees’ skill 
development. These results also show that the AME of most of the explanatory variables related to the 
probability of high skill improvement is crucial in the way that it is offset by the distinctive 
probabilities of being in the other categories, zero to eight. These marginal effects confirm our 
descriptive results that the probability of high skill improvement is greater for employees who 
participated in training or informal learning in comparison with those who did not. More precisely, 
workers who participated in training are, on average, 8.3 percentage points more likely to have highly 
improved their skills than those who did not participate in any training course. Similarly, participation 
in training seems to reduce the odds of experiencing skill worsening and stagnation by 1.4 and 4.9 
percentage points, respectively. In addition, employees’ involvement in informal learning is also 
positively related to their skills improving. For instance, the likelihood of a high improvement of skills 
is 16.8, 8.6, and 3.4 percentage points greater for workers who, respectively, always, usually, and 
sometimes learn informally on the job, in comparison with those who are never involved in informal 
learning in their job.  
Generally, our results so far suggest that the contribution of informal learning to workers’ skill 
development seems to be larger than that of training participation. To provide more insight into this 
possibility, we perform an estimation that includes a dummy variable for informal learning
17
 instead of 
                                                     
15 The coefficients are shown in Table A3 of the Appendix. This table shows the coefficients of our preferred specification in 
column (2) next to the resulting coefficients of a regression that does not include the interaction terms in column (1), for 
comparison purposes only. Our preferred specification (2) is shown to be better for at least two reasons: First, the likelihood 
ratio test (LR chi2 = 37.13) evaluated at 10 degrees of freedom is highly significant (Prob>chi2 = 0.0001), suggesting that the 
explanatory interaction terms included in the skill development is significant. Second, the difference of 57.1 points in the 
Bayesian information criterion between the two models provides strong support for the second model. More generally, we 
observe that the estimated threshold parameters of our models are not equally spread out, implying that the meaning of 
certain categories is, indeed, more expansive than others (specifically those corresponding to categories five to six, and nine 
to 10) and, therefore, that nonlinear estimations are more accurate. 
16 According to Long and Freese (2014), having more than two outcomes creates a challenge in summarising the effects of 
the independent variables in a way that fully reflects key substantive processes without overwhelming and distracting detail. 
We compute marginal effects in the four categories mentioned based on the criteria that the probabilities in the same group 
are of the same sign and similar size.  
17 This variable takes the value zero if the employee claimed to never be involved in informal learning on the job and takes 
the value one if the employee claimed to be involved in informal learning either sometimes, usually, or always.  
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the original categorical variable. The predicted probabilities show that, indeed, the relationship of skill 
development with informal learning on the job is stronger and significantly different than that with 
training participation (see Panel A of Table A5 in the Appendix). This supports Mincer’s (1974) claim 
that informal learning probably constitutes the major part of human capital investment in the 
workplace, given that workers likely spend much more time learning by doing in their job than in 
other training activities. 
The results in Table 2 also suggest that the initial job–skill mismatch of workers significantly 
helps to explain their skill development while in the same job. We find that initially underskilled 
workers develop their skills more than those who started in a job that matched their skills well. 
Conversely, overskilled employees are more likely to experience skill worsening (by 1.5 percentage 
points) and stagnation (by 4.4 percentage points) than well-matched employees, confirming the 
evidence on skill depreciation shown by De Grip et al. (2008).   
Regarding the covariates in our model, we find that the marginal probability of workers’ skill 
development decreases with age and is lower for employees who are more educated, for those who 
have temporary or agency contracts instead of permanent contracts, and for individuals who have 
experienced a decrease in the need to learn new things since the start of their job. Conversely, it 
increases with participation in formal education and years of tenure (which compensates for the 
negative effect of age by approximately three times) and tends to be higher for female employees and 
for those who have experienced an increasing need for learning or a major change in their job position, 
job task content, or working process. Other controls indicate that high skill development is less likely 
for individuals employed in low-skilled occupations.  
5.1.1 Heterogeneity by Skill Mismatch Status at Job Entry 
As explained in Section 4, we include interaction terms in our main ordered probit model to see 
whether there is heterogeneity in the relation between job-related learning and workers’ skill 
improvement due to differences in their initial job–skill mismatch status. Since the interpretation of 
these interactions is not as straightforward as it is for linear models, we compute the corresponding 
discrete double differences and statistical significance within and between the different skill mismatch 
statuses of workers. Two types of heterogeneity can be analysed. First, in Table 3, we show the 
difference in skill development of those who have been engaged in training or informal learning and 
those who have not within the same initial job–skill mismatch group.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here]  
Table 3 shows that the general findings of Table 2, that those who participate in training or informal 
learning show a larger skill development, hold for all workers, independent of their initial skill 
mismatch status. Compared to workers with the same initial skill mismatch status, those who 
participated in training or informal learning are more likely to improve their skills than those who have 
not been involved in any learning activity. Nonetheless, there seems to be some heterogeneity in the 
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magnitude of these relationships, particularly among workers with a job above their skill level. We 
find that these latter individuals do not show any significant difference in their skill improvement if 
they never participate in informal learning or if they do so only occasionally. Moreover, the 
association between their skill improvement and informal learning on a usual basis is shown to be 
weaker than – and significant with only 90 percent of confidence – within the well-matched and 
overskilled groups. This result suggests that informal learning needs to take place more often among 
underskilled employees to increase their probability of skill progress. Further analyses show that, 
within this group of underskilled employees, the relation of skill development with training is actually 
greater than that with informal learning, which is exactly the opposite within workers in a well-
matching job or a job below their skill level (see Panel B of Table A5 in the Appendix). 
Remarkably, Table 3 also indicates that within the initially overskilled employees, training and 
informal learning are positively associated with their skill development. For instance, overskilled 
workers who participate in training or always engage in informal learning are, respectively, 8.9 and 
20.6 percentage points more likely to develop their skills highly than overskilled workers who do not 
participate in training or who never engage in informal learning on the job. This could be because 
overskilled employees who invest in the development of their human capital acquire new skills that 
are different from those they have previously accumulated (e.g. non-technical or non-cognitive skills) 
or are more functional in offsetting skill depreciation. The latter explanation could be inferred from the 
significantly larger probabilities for overskilled workers in the skill change categories scored zero to 
four, and five and six (i.e. skill decline and more or less stable skills) in all types of learning.   
Second, in Table 4, we show the actual interaction effects, that is, the differences in skill 
development between well-matched and underskilled employees who participated in work-related 
learning, on the one hand, and between well-matched and overskilled employees who participated in 
work-related learning, on the other hand. These are the actual interaction results, which need to be 
interpreted simultaneously with the AMEs for well-matched workers, the reference category, shown in 
the first panel of Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here]  
Altogether, these results clearly show differences between workers who started in a job that matched 
their skills well and those who started in a job at a level either above or below their own skill level. In 
comparison with well-matched employees, the strength of the relationship between workers’ skill 
development and their participation in training or informal learning is stronger for those who were 
initially underskilled and weaker for those who were initially overskilled. For instance, underskilled 
employees who participated in training are 10.7 percentage points more likely to be in the two highest 
categories of skill development (nine to 10) than well-matched workers with similar learning 
investments. Similarly, underskilled workers who are always learning informally on the job are 11.2 
percentage points more likely to improve their skills highly. This suggests that, for underskilled 
workers, who are probably employed in a more demanding job, participation in training or informal 
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learning on the job is more favourable for their skill development. This could be due to richer learning 
opportunities at work and greater interest in maintaining their jobs (De Grip et al., 2008).  
Conversely, overskilled employees who participated in training are, on average, 6.6 
percentage points less likely to be in the two highest categories of skill development than similar 
workers in a well-matching job are. This implies, at the same time, that overskilled employees who 
participate in training are 1.1 percentage points more likely to experience skill depreciation (category 
zero to four) and 4 percentage points more likely to face stagnation in their skills (category five to six) 
than trained matched workers are. We find a similar pattern for informal learning. Compared to well-
matched workers with similar learning investments, overskilled employees who report that they 
always learn informally in their job are 5.8 percentage points less likely to improve their skills highly, 
which implies that, at the same time, they are 0.1 percentage points more likely to experience skill 
worsening and 3.7 percentage points more likely to face skill stagnation.  
This does not mean that learning has a negative impact on the skill accumulation of 
overskilled workers but that the positive relation is much weaker than it is for workers in a well-
matching job. For example, whereas well-matched employees who participate in training and who are 
always learning informally have average probabilities of high skill development of 8.5 percent and 
17.2 percent, respectively, the same probabilities for overskilled employees are, on average, 1.9 (8.5 
minus 6.6) percent and 11.4 (17.2 minus 5.8) percent, respectively. This result suggests that training 
and informal learning on the job are much less beneficial for overskilled workers than for those who 
are employed in a well-matching job. Nonetheless, the more often overskilled workers engage in 
training or informal learning, the lower their probability of skill decline and stagnation. This result 
again suggests that the learning investments of overskilled workers are more functional in preventing 
skill depreciation than in fostering skill accumulation.  
5.1.2 Robustness of the Main Results 
Whereas the data we use are unique in their wide range of information about workers’ skill 
development, learning participation, and initial mismatch status, there are also some drawbacks that 
could affect the precision of our estimates. In this section, we discuss the issues of endogeneity 
(omitted variables and measurement error) and the use and timing of self-reported measures as 
possible sources of bias. We argue that the probability of these potential sources of bias undermining 
the inferences and plausibility of the empirical findings of our study is very low. 
Endogeneity problems 
The most important concern is the endogeneity in our model due to omitted variable bias and possible 
measurement error. First, unobservable characteristics such as ability and motivation may affect 
employees’ learning participation decisions as well as their own perceived levels of skill improvement. 
For instance, if highly motivated workers are more likely to participate in training and informal 
learning and also tend to see greater improvement in their skill levels, our results would be affected by 
a positive bias. However, the ability bias is expected to be negative, since more able individuals will 
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tend to invest more in their human capital on the job but will also observe generally lower skill 
improvement, given the diminishing marginal utility of these investments. This would mean that our 
estimation results show a lower bound of the true effects.  
Omitted variable bias might also arise because workers’ own assessment of the (mis)match 
situation at job entry could vary with their personality traits, such as their degree of self-confidence. 
For example, individuals who are more confident about themselves will less often report an initial 
underskilled mismatch but might, simultaneously, be more likely to overestimate their own skill 
improvement. If these hypotheses are correct, then our results underestimate the true effects. Similarly, 
if individuals of higher ability are typically selected into well-matching or skill-challenging jobs, the 
expected endogeneity bias will also be negative. The opposite, however, would be expected with 
respect to omitted information on motivation.   
Although the preceding analysis suggests more reasons to consider a negative bias for our 
results, it is not obvious how all these sources of endogeneity will balance out in an empirical 
approach. To provide some insight into these issues, we perform robustness analyses, taking into 
account the information on worker attitudes that is available in our dataset, that is, learning motivation 
and the importance of career development opportunities for respondents in the acceptance of their 
current job.
18
 Table 5 presents the main results.  
Panel A of Table 5 shows that, as expected, learning motivation is significantly and positively 
related to workers’ skill development. However, including this confounder does not substantially 
change our main estimation results, which remain significant and of similar magnitude as those in 
Table 2.
19
 Similarly, the estimation results in Panel B show that the importance workers gave to career 
development opportunities in accepting their current job is also positively associated with their skill 
development. Nevertheless, the predicted probabilities for training and informal learning remain 
positive and significant in this specification, indicating that our main findings remain the same when 
we account for workers’ attitude towards career development opportunities.20 These results all hold for 
overskilled, underskilled, and well-matched employees.
21
 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here]  
                                                     
18 The variable for learning motivation is a standardised index derived from the question ‘On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is 
strongly disagree and 10 strongly agree, please indicate to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: a) I enjoy learning for its own sake, b) I try to relate learning to practical issues, and c) I prefer to have others 
plan my learning’. The variable for career development opportunities is derived from the question ‘Before you started 
working for your current employer, how important, if at all, were the opportunities for job career development in your 
decision to accept the job? Please use a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means not at all important, 5 means moderately important 
and 10 means essential’. 
19 Although this holds for all workers with low or high learning motivation, we observe that workers with stronger learning 
motivation show a greater skills increase in relation to both training and informal learning. 
20 Although this holds for all workers who responded with low or high importance to their job career development 
opportunities, we observe that workers who considered career opportunities more important in accepting the job show a 
greater skills increase in relation to both training and informal learning. 
21 Detailed tables of results within and across skill mismatch statuses are available upon request. 
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Measurement error and the timing of self-assessed variables 
A second concern is the possible bias of our results due to systematic measurement errors in the self-
assessed measures we use for our analyses. Our main dependent variable, skill development, and our 
key moderator variable in the model, initial skill mismatch status, are subjective self-assessments of 
workers based on a retrospective appraisal of the period since the respondent started the current job. 
The use of subjective data for research in topics such as this is legitimate, particularly given the 
difficulty of obtaining objective indicators for these variables. However, there are two major possible 
problems with these data. First, the self-assessed information could involve recall error. We consider 
that the magnitude of this type of measurement error is likely to differ across respondents due to the 
variation of time elapsed since job entry. Second, it could be possible that a worker’s skill 
development took place before the worker participated in on-the-job learning. We attempt to capture 
these two potential problems by estimating our main model for workers with different tenure. The idea 
behind these robustness analyses is that the degree to which recall bias or the reverse order of skill 
development and on-the-job learning most likely depends on the time elapsed since the start of the job.  
We therefore first estimate for each additional year of tenure the corresponding probability of 
high skill improvement (i.e. categories nine to 10 of our dependent variable) in relation to both 
training and informal learning. Figure 4 shows the estimation results evaluated over years of tenure. 
The left-hand side represents the AMEs of training and the right-hand side the AMEs of (sometimes 
and always) informal learning. We observe that, for both forms of learning, the predicted marginal 
probabilities of high skill improvement are, as expected, slightly increasing during the first period (six 
years) of tenure and then continue in a constant pattern until the later years of tenure. Nonetheless, the 
confidence intervals show that the point estimates for the various years of tenure are not significantly 
different from each other. This suggests that potential sources of bias due to systematic measurement 
error have not influenced our main results. This result also holds for the heterogeneity of our main 
findings between overskilled, underskilled, and well-matched employees, as shown in Figure A1 and 
Figure A2 in the Appendix. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here]  
Second, we assess the accuracy of our main results by comparing them with estimation results on 
more selective samples of workers for whom the recall bias and/or the reverse order of skill 
development and on-the-job learning could be considered to be at a minimum. These are workers with 
shorter periods of job tenure or those who have finished formal education more recently and are 
relatively younger. We present the corresponding results in Table 6. This table shows that the 
estimation results are similar in magnitude and significance to our main results in Table 2. This 
suggests that, although a bias due to measurement error in self-assessed variables could be important 
for the precision of measuring the true effects, this bias is not likely to be large enough to challenge 
the plausibility of our findings.  
[Insert Table 6 about here]  
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5.1.3 Additional Evidence on Job-Related Human Capital Investments and Skill Development 
In this section, we analyse whether there are any differences in the relevance of different types of 
training and informal learning for workers’ skill development. First, we distinguish between training 
participation during and outside working hours, and between training paid by the employer and by the 
employee. Second, we distinguish between informal learning from others (co-workers and 
supervisors), informal learning by trial and error, and informal leaning by self-study. 
Different types of training 
The results in Panel A of Table 7 show some heterogeneity with regards to different types of training 
for workers with a different mismatch status. We observe that employees in a well-matching job who 
followed training courses during working hours show greater improvement in their skills than those 
who participated in training outside working hours. For underskilled employees, the contribution of 
training outside working hours does not seem to be significant, whereas among overskilled workers 
the difference between training during and outside working hours is much lower (and statistically 
insignificant) in comparison with the other two groups of workers. Concerning the main funding 
sources of training, we find that, for well-matched and underskilled employees, the contribution of 
training paid by the employer to their skill development seems to be larger than that of training paid by 
the employees themselves. Conversely, we again observe that, among overskilled workers, the 
difference between training paid by the employer and training paid by the employee is lower and 
statistically insignificant.  
This heterogeneity could arise from differences in the relevance of the training content for 
workers with a different (mis)match.
22
 Since overskilled workers participate more often than others in 
training outside working hours and financed by themselves, it is plausible that they consider the 
investment in this training to be more general and useful to improve or update skills they do not use in 
their job. This could provide them with more opportunities to find a better job match in their current or 
other firms. This could explain why, in Panel B of Table 7, training outside working hours and training 
paid by the employee seem to be as useful for the skill development of overskilled workers as it is for 
the well-matched, whereas training during working hours and training paid by the employer appear to 
be less beneficial for the former group. Lastly, Panel B of Table 7 also suggests that, in comparison 
with employees in a well-matching job, training participation seems to be more beneficial for 
underskilled workers, regardless of the funding source and whether it occurs during or outside 
working time.  
[Insert Table 7 about here]  
Different types of informal learning 
To analyse whether there are any differences in the relevance of different types of informal learning 
for workers’ skill development, we distinguish between informal learning from others (co-workers and 
                                                     
22 An alternative explanation could be that the duration of these different types of training differs across workers. We, cannot, 
however, analyse this possibility, since there is no information on training duration/intensity available in our dataset.  
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supervisors), informal learning by trial and error, or learning by doing, and informal leaning by self-
study. Since the question for the different types of informal learning was only asked to those who 
reported a positive skill change (i.e. categories scoring six to 10), here we can use a sample of only 
31,385 observations. The results in Table 8 show that, indeed, the relation between informal learning 
and skill improvement differs with the type of informal learning and it is heterogeneous across 
employees with different initial skill mismatch situations. We find, as shown in Panel A of Table 8, 
that, for workers in well-matching jobs, informal learning from colleagues and supervisors seems to 
contribute to their skill improvement as much as informal learning by trial and error and self-study. 
Underskilled workers, however, show greater skill improvement when learning by self-study than 
when learning from others, while there does not seem to be any significant difference in skill 
improvement between those who are involved in learning by trial and error and those who are not. In 
contrast, for the skill improvement of overskilled workers, informal learning from colleagues and 
supervisors seems to be as important as learning by doing, whereas learning by self-study does not 
make any significant contribution.
23
 Panel B of Table 8 again shows that, in comparison with well-
matched workers with similar informal learning participation, the relation between skill development 
and all three types of informal learning is stronger among workers with a job above their skill levels, 
and weaker for those with a job below their skill level.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here]  
5.2 On-the-job Learning Complementarity and Workers’ Skill Development  
In this section we raise the question whether or not the complementarity (or substitutability) between 
training and informal learning at work is related to the development of workers’ skills.  
First, we examine whether there is complementarity or substitution between training and 
informal learning. The estimation results of a multivariate analysis show that, as expected, training and 
informal learning on the job complement each other (see Table 9).
24
 This complementarity holds for 
all well-matched, underskilled, and overskilled workers, although the strength of this complementarity 
differs between the three skill-mismatch groups (see Tables A6 and A7 in the Appendix). In 
comparison with initially well-matched workers, the complementarity is stronger among those who 
were initially underskilled for their job and slightly weaker but still positive among initially 
overskilled employees.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here]  
Second, to find out whether this complementarity plays a role in workers’ skill development, we 
introduce interaction terms between the work-related learning variables in our main model and 
estimate the corresponding AMEs of training and informal learning conditionally evaluated on each 
                                                     
23 Note, however, that we cannot make any inference regarding skill maintenance or decline due to sample truncation.  
24 The complementarity means that, on the one hand, the frequency of informal learning increases when a worker participates 
in training and, on the other hand, the average individual probability of training participation is higher the more often the 
worker engages in informal learning.  
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other. This allows us to assess if the investment in each type of learning is related to any additional 
increase in the probability of skill improvement when the worker also engages in the other type of 
learning and if the probability of skill improvement increases further when the worker engages in both 
forms of learning. Panel A of Table 10 shows that this is indeed the case. For example, on average, the 
probability of a high improvement of skills associated with training participation increases from 6.9 to 
9.5 percentage points if the worker always participates in informal learning instead of never doing 
so.
25
 The same holds for the skill development likelihood related to informal learning; it is 
significantly higher if workers also participate in training. This result suggests that training and 
informal learning provide workers with complementary skills rather than substitutable skills. 
Moreover, this complementarity appears to favour their skill accumulation. The interaction outcome 
shown in Panel B of Table 10 indicates that the probability of a high improvement of skills when 
employees engage in both types of work-related learning (0.250) is significantly higher than the sum 
(0.224) of the partial contributions of training (0.069) and informal learning (0.155) if workers 
participate in only one of these forms of learning.
26
 Consistent with Cunha and Hekman’s (2007) 
notions of direct complementarity and cross-productivity, the complementarity between training and 
informal learning is positively related to a significant additional improvement of workers’ skills. This 
suggests that not only training participation encourages informal learning and vice versa, but also the 
skills acquired through both forms of work-related learning seem to boost each other in a multiplier 
process that further reinforces the skill development of workers who participate in both types of work-
related learning. 
[Insert Table 10 about here]  
5.2.1 Heterogeneity in Learning Complementarity and Workers’ Skill Development   
To assess if the additional improvement of skills associated with the complementarity between 
training and informal learning holds to the same extent for initially well-matched, underskilled, and 
overskilled employees, we estimate the AMEs of a three-way interaction term between the two forms 
of learning and the indicator for the initial skill mismatch in our main model. In Table 11 we present 
the most relevant estimation results.
27
 The table shows that the complementarity between training and 
informal learning relates to additional gains in skill development only for initially well-matched
28
 and 
overskilled
29
 workers. Although training and informal learning are both associated with greater 
                                                     
25 This difference (0.026) is significant with 99 percent confidence (Chi2 (1) = 51.3, p = 0.000). This is equivalent to the 
statistical difference (0.026) between the probability of a high improvement of skills associated with informal learning 
‘always’ if workers also participate in training (0.181) and if they do not participate in training (0.155). This latter difference 
is also significant with 99 percent confidence (Chi2 (1) = 35.9, p = 0.000). 
26 This difference (0.026) is significant with 99 percent confidence (Chi2 (1) = 127.1, p = 0.000) and equal to the 
corresponding difference between the conditional contributions of training and informal learning, as explained in footnote 25.  
27 Complete tables are available upon request. 
28 For workers in an initially well-matching job, the probability of a high improvement of skills when they engage in both 
types of work-related learning (0.253) is higher than the sum (0.232) of the partial contributions of training (0.073) and 
informal learning (0.159). The difference (0.021) is significant with 99 percent confidence (Chi2 (1) = 96.7 p = 0.000). 
29 For initially overskilled workers, the probability of a high improvement of skills when they engage in both types of work-
related learning (0.289) is higher than the sum (0.255) of the partial contributions of training (0.070) and informal learning 
(0.187). The difference (0.032) is significant with 99 percent confidence (Chi2 (1) = 159.6, p = 0.000). 
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improvement in the skills of underskilled workers, the complementarity between these two types of 
learning does not seem to add any further to that skill improvement.
30
 If we extend the analysis of 
Cunha and Heckman (2007) to the workplace, as presented in Section 2.2, our findings are consistent 
with their notion of the skills multiplier. In their model, more complementarity of human capital 
implies greater productivity of new investments but, as the degree of complementarity increases, the 
role of the skill multiplier decreases. According to our findings, this holds for all three job–skill 
(mis)match groups in our analysis. Together, the results of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that having a 
higher initial stock of skills than required for the job implies a greater skill multiplier potential. 
However, this potential seems to be hampered by the tendency of overskilled workers to participate 
much less in both training and informal learning, in comparison to workers in a well-matching job. 
This situation not only seems to diminish the complementarity of human capital among overskilled 
workers, but also relates to a lower probability of developing their skills. Conversely, in comparison to 
well-matched workers, those who were initially underskilled show a higher complementarity of human 
capital as they participate more often in training and informal learning, which seems to compensate for 
their disadvantage in the skill multiplier potential. This suggests that work-related learning helps in 
reducing the initial skill gap of underskilled workers. However, as implied by Carneiro and Heckman 
(2003), this learning could be more costly due to (1) the greater need for complementary investments 
in both training and informal learning to compensate for their initial disadvantage and (2) our finding 
that their lower initial stock of job skills seems to weaken the multiplier potential of these investments 
for their skill development. Nevertheless, initially underskilled workers still show the greatest 
improvement in skills among all workers who invest in their human capital while on the job.  
 
[Insert Table 11 about here]  
6. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we have analysed the extent to which training and informal learning on the job are 
related to the skill development of workers in 28 European countries. Consistent with assumptions 
from human capital theory, we find that employees who have been involved in training and informal 
learning show greater improvement of their skills. In line with Mincer’s (1974) claim, we find that 
informal learning is more strongly related to the improvement of workers’ skills than training 
participation is. However, this does not mean that participation in training is not important. Training 
and informal learning are shown to be complementary and this complementarity seems to further 
favour workers’ skill development, since we find that those who participate in both forms of learning 
show a significant additional improvement of their skills. This is likely explained by the 
complementarity and cross-productivity between investments in human capital and their impact in the 
multiplier process of skills (Cunha & Heckman, 2007) that can also occur in the workplace, making 
the skills acquired by training and informal learning mutually-reinforcing.  
                                                     
30 For initially underskilled workers, the probability of a high improvement of skills when they engage in both types of work-
related learning (0.213) is statistically equivalent to the sum (0.212) of the partial contributions of training (0.079) and 
informal learning (0.133) (Chi2 (1) = 0.4, p = 0.527). 
23 
 
We also analysed the heterogeneity in the relation between the two forms of job-related learning and 
workers’ skill development with respect to their initial skill mismatch status. First, our results show 
that workers who participate in training or informal learning are more likely to improve their skills 
considerably than those with the same initial skill mismatch status who have not been involved in any 
learning activity. This result suggests that on-the-job learning helps improve the skills of both matched 
and mismatched workers. Second, compared to those who started in a job that matched well their 
skills, the skill development of underskilled workers appears to benefit the most from both training 
and informal learning, whereas the skill development of the overskilled benefits the least. In particular, 
human capital investments in the latter group seem to be more functional in offsetting skill 
depreciation and preserving their skill levels than in fostering skill accumulation.  
The finding that underskilled employees who participate in training and informal learning 
show the largest increase in their skills suggests that human capital investments on the job could help 
to improve the job–skill match of these workers by closing the gap between their initial skill levels and 
the skills required in the workplace (Arulampalam et al., 2004). This could be motivated by a greater 
interest of these employees in maintaining their job or by richer learning opportunities offered at work 
(De Grip et al., 2008). In contrast, the finding that overskilled workers have the lowest probabilities of 
skill improvement and participation in both training and informal learning suggests that work-related 
human capital investments for these workers could be more relevant in maintaining the skills they do 
not use in their job or as a mitigating factor counteracting skill obsolescence (Mincer & Ofek, 1982; 
De Grip & van Loo, 2002), which could provide them with prospects to find a better job match in the 
current firm or other firms. It is, therefore, important to recognise the overskilled workers’ need to 
participate in training and informal learning, even though they have the least increase in skills.  
In our study, we find further heterogeneity across workers with a different job–skill 
(mis)matches regarding the (1) complementary of human capital investments and (2) the multiplier 
potential of these investments for their skill development. On the one hand, overskilled workers are 
shown to have a greater skill multiplier potential but, at the same time, significantly lower rates of 
participation in both training and informal learning and lesser complementarity between these human 
capital investments than employees in a well-matching job. Accordingly, initially overskilled workers 
show the lowest probabilities of skill improvement. On the other hand, underskilled workers are more 
likely to participate in both training and informal learning and show greater complementarities 
between these human capital investments, which seems to compensate for the disadvantage in the 
skills multiplier potential, given their lower stock of job–skill in comparison with well-matched 
employees. Underskilled workers therefore show the greatest probabilities of skill improvement 
among all workers who participate in work-related learning.  
Our study then suggests that the interaction between work-related human capital investments 
and the utilisation of workers’ initial stock of skills in their job plays an important role in the process 
of skill development. According to the literature on skills formation (e.g. Cunha & Heckman, 2007) as 
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well as the literature on skill obsolescence (e.g. Mincer & Ofek, 1982, De Grip & van Loo, 2002), 
being overskilled at job entry could be a negative context, not only because a worker’s initial stock of 
skills may deteriorate due to non-use, but also because this deterioration may decrease the productivity 
and complementarity of further learning investments in the process of human capital accumulation. In 
contrast, being underskilled could be a positive context to raise the level and productivity of further 
learning investments. However, as implied by Carneiro and Heckman (2003), the elimination of the 
skill gap of these workers might be more costly due to the greater need for complementary 
investments in both training and informal learning and because their lower initial stock of job skills 
seems to weaken the multiplier potential of these investments in comparison with workers whose skills 
better match their job requirements.   
Since lifelong learning and workers’ skill development are essential for the productivity of 
firms with rapidly changing skill demands and for economic progress (World Economic Forum, 
2014), knowledge about heterogeneities in the role of training and informal learning in workers’ skill 
development with respect to their initial skill mismatch is crucial to make efficient decisions on human 
capital investments. Optimal decisions on investment in lifelong learning could contribute to reduce 
the misalignment between workers’ potential productivity and the optimal productivity of their jobs. In 
this respect, it is important that more – in particular longitudinal – research be done on the causal 
effects of both formal training and informal learning on workers’ skill development taking into 
account the basis and extent of the skill (mis)match they face in their jobs.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Distribution of skill development since job entry 
Skill change % 
My skills have worsened a lot  0 0.2 
1 0.2 
2 0.5 
3 0.8 
4 1.3 
My skills have stayed the same   5 10.9 
6 7.5 
7 16.9 
8 25.0 
9 17.1 
My skills have improved a lot  10  19.7 
 
 
Table 2. Average marginal effects (AMEs) on workers’ skill development  
Skill change 0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 
Training -0.014*** -0.049*** -0.020*** 0.083*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
IL sometimes -0.012** -0.025** 0.003 0.034** 
 
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.016) 
IL usually -0.021*** -0.056*** -0.009** 0.086*** 
 
(0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012) 
IL always -0.029*** -0.099*** -0.040*** 0.168*** 
 
(0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.016) 
Formal education -0.008*** -0.030*** -0.015*** 0.053*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
Initially underskilled -0.012*** -0.056*** -0.041*** 0.109*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Initially overskilled 0.015*** 0.044*** 0.007*** -0.066*** 
 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) 
Age 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female -0.010*** -0.039*** -0.021*** 0.070*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) 
Intermediate level education 0.003*** 0.013*** 0.009*** -0.025*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) 
High level education 0.010*** 0.038*** 0.023*** -0.071*** 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) 
Years of tenure -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
This table shows AMEs computed on the ordered probit specification (2) in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
The dependent variable skill change is measured by 11 ordinal categories from zero to 10 (0= skills have 
worsened a lot, 5= skills have stayed the same, 10= skills have improved a lot). AMEs on skill change are 
grouped into four categories: worsened (0-4), no or hardly any change (5-6), intermediate improvement 
(7-8), and high improvement (9-10). The AME for categorical variables is the discrete change from the 
base level. Standard errors clustered at country level are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
< 0.01. N = 37,285. 
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Table 3. AMEs of work-related learning on workers’ skill development                                                                            
within job–skill (mis)match groups 
Skill change  0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 
Initially well matched  
    
Training  -0.012*** -0.051*** -0.022*** 0.085*** 
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) 
IL sometimes -0.008** -0.026** -0.005*** 0.039** 
  (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.020) 
IL usually -0.015*** -0.055*** -0.017*** 0.087*** 
  (0.005) (0.015) (0.003) (0.015) 
IL always -0.023*** -0.099*** -0.050*** 0.172*** 
  (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.018) 
Initially underskilled     
Training  -0.006*** -0.035*** -0.038*** 0.079*** 
  (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) 
IL sometimes -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.014) (0.013) (0.030) 
IL usually -0.004* -0.023* -0.022* 0.049* 
  (0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.028) 
IL always -0.008*** -0.055*** -0.070*** 0.133*** 
  (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) 
Initially overskilled     
Training -0.021*** -0.063*** -0.005** 0.089*** 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) 
IL sometimes -0.023** -0.051*** 0.013* 0.061*** 
  (0.009) (0.016) (0.007) (0.012) 
IL usually -0.038*** -0.096*** 0.010* 0.124*** 
  (0.010) (0.017) (0.005) (0.014) 
IL always -0.051*** -0.145*** -0.010* 0.206*** 
  (0.010) (0.018) (0.005) (0.017) 
This table shows AMEs computed on the ordered probit specification (2) in Table A3 in the 
Appendix. The dependent variable skill change is measured by 11 ordinal categories from zero to 10 
(0= skills have worsened a lot, 5= skills have stayed the same, 10= skills have improved a lot). AMEs 
on skill change are grouped into four categories: worsened (0-4), no or hardly any change (5-6), 
intermediate improvement (7-8), and high improvement (9-10). The AME for categorical variables is 
the discrete change from the base level. Standard errors clustered at country level are shown in 
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  N = 37,285. 
 
 
Table 4. AMEs of work-related learning on workers’ skill development                                       
between job–skill s (mis)match groups (Interaction effects) 
Skill change 0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 
Initially underskilled (well matched ref.) 
Training  -0.009*** -0.050*** -0.048*** 0.107*** 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
IL sometimes -0.014*** -0.060*** -0.031*** 0.105*** 
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) 
IL usually -0.006*** -0.044*** -0.059*** 0.109*** 
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) 
IL always -0.011*** -0.056*** -0.045*** 0.112*** 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) 
Initially overskilled (well matched ref.) 
Training 0.011*** 0.040*** 0.015*** -0.066*** 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) 
IL sometimes 0.019*** 0.054*** 0.002 -0.075*** 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) 
IL usually 0.007*** 0.033*** 0.022*** -0.062*** 
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
IL always 0.010*** 0.037*** 0.011*** -0.058*** 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) 
This table shows AMEs computed on the ordered probit specification (2) in Table A3 in the 
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Appendix. The dependent variable skill change is measured by 11 ordinal categories from zero to 10 
(0= skills have worsened a lot, 5= skills have stayed the same, 10= skills have improved a lot). AMEs 
on skill change are grouped into four categories: worsened (0-4), no or hardly any change (5-6), 
intermediate improvement (7-8), and high improvement (9-10). The AME for categorical variables is 
the discrete change from the base level. Standard errors clustered at country level are shown in 
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N = 37,285. 
 
 
 
Table 5. AMEs of work-related learning on workers’ skill development                                                      
including information on workers’ learning and career attitudes  
Skill change 0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 
A. AMEs of work-related learning including learning motivation                                                                            
Training -0.015*** -0.045*** -0.018*** 0.078*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) 
IL sometimes -0.018*** -0.038*** 0.000 0.056*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.015) 
IL usually -0.027*** -0.068*** -0.009** 0.104*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.013) 
IL always -0.036*** -0.103*** -0.034*** 0.173*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.015) 
Underskilled -0.013*** -0.056*** -0.044*** 0.113*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
overskilled 0.020*** 0.051*** 0.007*** -0.078*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) 
Learning motivation (std) -0.013*** -0.041*** -0.020*** 0.074*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
B. AMEs of work-related learning including importance of career development 
Training -0.013*** -0.045*** -0.019*** 0.077*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
IL sometimes -0.009** -0.021** 0.003 0.027** 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.013) 
IL usually -0.017*** -0.048*** -0.007* 0.072*** 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.018) 
IL always -0.026*** -0.088*** -0.037*** 0.151*** 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.020) 
Underskilled -0.013*** -0.058*** -0.042*** 0.113*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
overskilled 0.013*** 0.040*** 0.007*** -0.060*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) 
Importance of career (std) -0.007*** -0.024*** -0.012*** 0.043*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
This table shows AMEs computed on an ordered probit specification similar to column (2) in 
Table A3 in the Appendix that includes a variable for learning attitude (Panel A) and a variable 
for the importance of career development opportunities to accept the job at the first place (in 
Panel B). The dependent variable skill change is measured by 11 ordinal categories from zero to 
10 (0= skills have worsened a lot, 5= skills have stayed the same, 10= skills have improved a 
lot). AMEs on skill change are grouped into four categories: worsened (0-4), no or hardly any 
change (5-6), intermediate improvement (7-8), and high improvement (9-10). The AME for 
categorical variables is the discrete change from the base level. Standard errors clustered at 
country level are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N = 29,018 (Panel 
A). N=37,285 (Panel B). 
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Table 6. AMEs of work-related learning on workers’ skill development (cat. 9-10)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Tenure      
< = 2 
Tenure              
< = 5 
Tenure            
< = 10 
Left 
education             
< = 5 
Left 
education                
< = 10 
Left 
education       
< = 5 
Age < = 40 
Left                      
education                
< = 10 
Age < = 40 
Training 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.067*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) 
IL sometimes 0.042** 0.040** 0.037** 0.029* 0.032** 0.025* 0.028** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
IL usually 0.098*** 0.094*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.070*** 0.077*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
IL always 0.149*** 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.154*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.142*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) 
Underskilled 0.105*** 0.114*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) 
overskilled -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.090*** -0.075*** -0.084*** -0.077*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) 
Tenure 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 7,434 14,247 23,076 4,944 10,503 3,816 8,263 
This table shows AMEs computed on an ordered probit specification similar to column (2) in Table A3 in the Appendix that restricts 
the corresponding sample to workers with the characteristics mentioned in the column heading. Tenure refers to the time (in years) 
that the individual has been working for the current employer. Left education refers to the time (in years) elapsed since the worker 
obtained his highest educational degree. Since several people finished education while working, in columns (6) and (7) we further 
restrict the sample combining the criterion on time elapsed since the worker finished formal education with a criterion on age. The 
dependent variable skill change is measured by 11 ordinal categories from zero to 10 (0= skills have worsened a lot, 5= skills have 
stayed the same, 10= skills have improved a lot). AMEs on skill change are grouped into four categories: worsened (0-4), no or 
hardly any change (5-6), intermediate improvement (7-8), and high improvement (9-10). This table shows the AME only for the last 
category, that is, high improvement of skills. The AME for categorical variables is the discrete change from the base level. Standard 
errors clustered at country level are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 7. AMEs of different types of training on workers’ skill development 
Skill change 0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 
A. AMEs within job–skill (mis)match groups 
Initially well matched     
Training during working hours -0.008*** -0.028*** -0.013*** 0.049*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
Training outside working hours -0.005** -0.008** -0.004* 0.017** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) 
Training paid by employer -0.006*** -0.031*** -0.012*** 0.049*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
Training paid by employee -0.004* -0.016** -0.007** 0.027** 
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.012) 
Initially underskilled     
Training during working hours -0.003*** -0.019*** -0.022*** 0.044*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Training outside working hours -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 0.011 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) 
Training paid by employer -0.003
*** -0.020*** -0.022*** 0.045*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) 
Training paid by employee -0.008
** -0.016** -0.002 0.026** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.013) 
Initially overskilled     
Training during working hours -0.012*** -0.035*** -0.004*** 0.051*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) 
Training outside working hours -0.010*** -0.033*** -0.002 0.045*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.010) 
Training paid by employer -0.013*** -0.020** -0.022** 0.055*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) 
Training paid by employee -0.011** -0.031*** -0.004*** 0.046** 
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.021) 
B. AMEs between job–skill (mis)match groups (well matched ref) 
Initially underskilled     
Training during working hours -0.009*** -0.051*** -0.044*** 0.104*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Training outside working hours -0.006 -0.022** -0.018*** 0.046** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.022) 
Training paid by employer -0.008*** -0.053*** -0.043*** 0.104*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Training paid by employee -0.010*** -0.052*** -0.037*** 0.099*** 
  (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) 
Initially overskilled     
Training during working hours 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.012*** -0.040*** 
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) 
Training outside working hours 0.010 0.016 0.005* -0.031 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.025) 
Training paid by employer 0.008*** 0.025*** 0.005* -0.038*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.014) 
Training paid by employee 0.009 0.014 0.000 -0.023 
  (0.008) (0.019) (0.003) (0.022) 
This table shows AMEs computed on an ordered probit regression similar to specification (2) in Table 2 that includes a 
categorical variable that distinguishes either between training during and outside regular working hours or between 
training financed by the employer and the employee. Workers who did not participate in any training are the reference 
category in both cases. The dependent variable skill change is measured by 11 ordinal categories from zero to 10 (0= 
skills have worsened a lot, 5= skills have stayed the same, 10= skills have improved a lot). AMEs on skill change are 
grouped into four categories: worsened (0-4), no or hardly any change (5-6), intermediate improvement (7-8), and high 
improvement (9-10). The AME for categorical variables is the discrete change from the base level. Standard errors 
clustered at country level are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  N = 36,477. 
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Table 8. AMEs of different types of informal learning on workers’ skill improvement 
Skill change 6 7 8 9 10 
A. AMEs within job–skill (mis)match groups 
Initially well matched      
IL from others -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.006*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
IL by trial and error -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.003*** 0.005** 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
IL by self-study -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
Initially underskilled      
IL from others -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.008*** 0.004*** 0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) 
IL by trial and error -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) 
IL by self-study -0.013*** -0.022*** -0.014*** 0.007*** 0.042*** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) 
Initially overskilled      
IL from others -0.011** -0.011** -0.001** 0.007** 0.016** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) 
IL by trial and error -0.011** -0.011** -0.002** 0.007** 0.017** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) 
IL by self-study -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) 
B. AMEs between job–skill (mis)match groups (well matched ref.) 
Initially underskilled      
IL from others -0.022
*** -0.028*** -0.020*** 0.016*** 0.054*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
IL by trial and error -0.029
*** -0.038*** -0.015*** 0.017*** 0.065*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) 
IL by self-study -0.032
*** -0.047*** -0.024*** 0.018*** 0.085*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Initially overskilled      
IL from others 0.007
*** 0.011*** 0.003*** -0.009*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
IL by trial and error 0.011
*** 0.013*** 0.003*** -0.007*** -0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
IL by self-study 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.004*** -0.008*** -0.024*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) 
This table shows AMEs computed on an ordered probit regression similar to specification (2) in 
Table 2 that includes three dummy variables to account for the three different types of informal 
learning. Since the question for the different types of informal learning was only asked to those 
who reported a positive skill change, the dependent variable skill change in this regression only 
takes values from six to 10. The AME for categorical variables is the discrete change from the 
base level. Standard errors clustered at country level are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01.  N = 31,385. 
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Table 9. Complementarity between training and informal learning (AMEs) 
Training Probit AMEs 
(IL never ref.)  
IL sometimes 0.178*** 
 (0.019) 
IL usually 0.239*** 
 (0.019) 
IL always 0.255*** 
 (0.023) 
 
 
 
All other controls are included. AMEs for categorical variables is the discrete change from 
the base level. Standard errors clustered at country level are shown in parentheses. *p < 
0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. N= 37,187. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Conditional AMEs of training and informal learning on workers’ skill development  
Skill change 0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 
A. Conditional AMEs 
AME of Training 
at IL never -0.018*** -0.051*** -0.000 0.069*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
at IL sometimes -0.016*** -0.053*** -0.012*** 0.081*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) 
at IL usually -0.012*** -0.051*** -0.025*** 0.088*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
at IL always -0.009*** -0.044*** -0.042*** 0.095*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
AME of IL sometimes  
at Training=0 -0.011** -0.024** 0.012** 0.023* 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) 
at Training=1 -0.009** -0.026** -0.000 0.035** 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.015) 
AME of IL usually     
at Training=0 -0.023*** -0.056*** 0.005 0.074*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.011) 
at Training=1 -0.017*** -0.056*** -0.020*** 0.093*** 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) 
AME of IL always     
at Training=0 -0.034*** -0.104*** -0.017*** 0.155*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.012) 
at Training=1 -0.025*** -0.097*** -0.059*** 0.181*** 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) 
2. Interaction effect (Training = 0 and IL never ref.) 
at Training = 1 and IL always -0.043*** -0.148*** -0.059*** 0.250*** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.018) 
This table shows the conditional AMEs computed on an ordered probit regression similar to 
specification (2) in Table 2 that includes an interaction term between the training and informal 
learning variables. The dependent variable skill change is measured by 11 ordinal categories from 
zero to 10 (0= skills have worsened a lot, 5= skills have stayed the same, 10= skills have improved a 
lot). AMEs on skill change are grouped into four categories: worsened (0-4), no or hardly any change 
(5-6), intermediate improvement (7-8), and high improvement (9-10). Standard errors clustered at 
country level are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  N = 37,285. 
 
 
 
 
Informal learning 
Oprobit AMEs 
Never Sometimes Usually Always 
Training  -0.019*** -0.072*** 0.026*** 0.065*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
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Table 11. Conditional AMEs of work-related learning on workers’ skill development                     
within and between job–skill s (mis)match groups 
Skill change 0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 
Initially well matched 
AME of Training    at IL never -0.014*** -0.056*** -0.003 0.073*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
                                at IL always -0.007*** -0.045*** -0.042*** 0.094*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
     
AME of IL always  at Training = 0 -0.026*** -0.108*** -0.025*** 0.159*** 
 (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.014) 
                                 at Training = 1 -0.019*** -0.097*** -0.064*** 0.180*** 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015) 
     
Interaction effect within well-matched workers (Training = 0 and IL never ref.) 
Training = 1 and IL always -0.033*** -0.153*** -0.067*** 0.253*** 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.005) (0.021) 
Initially underskilled     
AME of Training    at IL never -0.007*** -0.039*** -0.033*** 0.079*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) 
                                at IL always -0.003*** -0.028*** -0.049*** 0.080*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.014) 
     
AME of IL always  at Training = 0 -0.010*** -0.062*** -0.061*** 0.133*** 
 (0.003) (0.018) (0.013) (0.023) 
                                 at Training = 1 -0.006*** -0.051*** -0.077*** 0.134*** 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.018) (0.026) 
     
Interaction effect within underskilled workers (Training = 0 and IL never ref.) 
Training = 1 and IL always -0.013*** -0.090*** -0.110*** 0.213*** 
 (0.004) (0.018) (0.015) (0.031) 
Interaction effect between underskilled and well-matched workers (Training = 1 and IL always ref.) 
Training = 1 and IL always -0.005*** -0.036*** -0.057*** 0.098*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) 
Initially overskilled     
AME of Training    at IL never -0.036*** -0.066*** 0.032*** 0.070*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
                                 at IL always -0.012*** -0.057*** -0.033*** 0.102*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
     
AME of IL always  at Training = 0 -0.065*** -0.154*** 0.032** 0.187*** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.008) (0.015) 
                                 at Training = 1 -0.041*** -0.145*** -0.033*** 0.219*** 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.008) (0.017) 
     
Interaction effect within overskilled workers (Training = 0 and IL never ref.) 
Training = 1 and IL always -0.077*** -0.211*** -0.001 0.289*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.022) 
     
Interaction effect between overskilled and well-matched workers (Training = 1 and IL always ref.) 
Training = 1 and IL always 0.004*** 0.028*** 0.023*** -0.055*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) 
This table shows conditional AMEs computed on an ordered probit regression similar to specification (2) in Table 
2 that includes a third-way interaction term between the learning variables and the initial skill mismatch indicator. 
The dependent variable skill change is measured by 11 ordinal categories from zero to 10 (0= skills have worsened 
a lot, 5= skills have stayed the same, 10= skills have improved a lot). AMEs on skill change are grouped into four 
categories: worsened (0-4), no or hardly any change (5-6), intermediate improvement (7-8), and high improvement 
(9-10). Standard errors clustered at country level are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  N 
= 37,285. 
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Figure 1. Skill development distribution by training participation  
 
Figure 2. Skill development distribution by frequency of informal learning  
  
Figure 3. Skill development distribution by initial job–skill mismatch  
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Figure 4. AMEs of work-related learning on workers’ skill development (cat. 9-10)                    
over years of tenure 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1. Distribution of the sample 
Country Obs. % Sample 
% Initially 
well matched 
% Initially 
underskilled 
% Initially 
overskilled 
United Kingdom  2,830 7.6 41.8 24.0 34.2 
Greece  1,450 3.9 41.9 19.8 38.3 
Slovakia  835 2.2 41.9 36.1 22.0 
Ireland 749 2.0 42.7 26.7 30.6 
Austria  726 2.0 43.5 23.0 33.5 
Finland  1,578 4.2 43.9 29.0 27.2 
Cyprus  396 1.1 46.0 29.3 24.8 
Czech Republic  1,278 3.4 48.4 32.9 18.7 
Estonia  852 2.3 48.5 40.9 10.7 
Lithuania  820 2.2 49.9 39.2 11.0 
France  3,090 8.3 50.7 23.9 25.4 
Poland  3,175 8.5 51.1 21.5 27.3 
Spain  2,915 7.8 51.2 17.7 31.2 
Germany  2,937 7.9 51.8 19.1 29.2 
Latvia  808 2.2 52.4 37.0 10.6 
Denmark  694 1.9 52.5 24.1 23.5 
Belgium  1,003 2.7 52.6 20.2 27.1 
Italy  2,283 6.1 53.8 20.5 25.8 
Hungary  1,275 3.4 54.6 21.8 23.6 
Bulgaria  882 2.4 55.7 27.1 17.2 
Croatia  884 2.4 56.9 22.4 20.7 
Netherlands  820 2.2 57.1 20.2 22.7 
Sweden  742 2.0 57.3 19.3 23.5 
Portugal  1,276 3.4 57.6 24.1 18.3 
Malta   407 1.1 57.7 28.8 13.5 
Romania  1,303 3.5 59.6 25.6 14.8 
Slovenia  856 2.3 60.5 18.5 21.0 
Luxembourg  421 1.1 73.6 11.4 15.0 
TOTAL 37,285 100 50.94 23.92 25.14 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics  
 
All 
Initially 
well matched 
        (51%) 
Initially 
underskilled 
 (24%) 
Initially 
overskilled  
(25%) 
Training (during tenure) 0.62 0.61 0.70 0.58 
Training 12 months 0.57 0.56 0.60 0.55 
Training during working hours 0.45 0.43 0.49 0.43 
Training outside working hours 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.24 
Training paid by the employer 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.66 
Training paid by the employee 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.16 
IL never 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 
IL sometimes 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.45 
IL usually 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.30 
IL always 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.20 
IL from others* 0.77 0.76 0.86 0.72 
IL by trial and error* 0.61 0.58 0.70 0.58 
IL by self-study* 0.56 0.52 0.63 0.55 
Formal education (during tenure) 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.11 
Individual characteristics      
Age (24-65) s.d. = 9.8 42.10 42.39 41.33 42.25 
Female 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.37 
Low level of education 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 
Intermediate level of education 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.38 
High level of education 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.52 
Years of tenure (0-41) s.d.= 9.3 10.50 10.88 11.33 8.93 
Permanent contract 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.85 
Fixed temporary contract 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.12 
Temporary agency contract 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
No formal contract 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Telephone (interviewed) 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.13 
Industry  
   
Agriculture 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Manufacturing 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.18 
Construction 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 
Sales and transportation 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.23 
Information and communication 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 
Financial and real state 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Professional and Tech 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 
Public administration 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 
Other services 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Occupation  
   
Managers 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 
Professionals 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.18 
Technicians 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.15 
Service and sales workers 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14 
Clerical support 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.24 
Skilled agricultural 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Building, crafts or related trades 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06 
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Plant and machine operators 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Elementary 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Firm size  
   
1-9 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
10-49 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.27 
50-99 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 
100-249 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 
250-499 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 
>500  0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 
Observations 37,285 18,992 8,919 9,374 
*
For these variables we have fewer observations (31,954). It is because the respective questions were only asked to 
respondents who reported a positive skill change in our dependent variable (i.e. above category 5 in the 0-10 scale).  
 
 
 
Table A3. Ordered probit coefficients for skill development 
Skill change (1) (2) 
Training  0.255
***
 0.251
***
 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
IL sometimes 0.145
**
 0.122
*
 
 (0.056) (0.064) 
IL usually 0.300
***
 0.258
***
 
 (0.061) (0.069) 
IL always 0.540
***
 0.501
***
 
 (0.067) (0.073) 
Formal education 0.154
***
 0.139
***
 
 (0.021) (0.031) 
Initially underskilled 0.304
***
 0.461
***
 
 (0.016) (0.084) 
Initially overskilled -0.218
***
 -0.389
***
 
 (0.026) (0.081) 
Training # Initially underskilled  -0.035 
  (0.036) 
Training # Initially overskilled  0.039
*
 
  (0.021) 
IL sometimes # Initially underskilled  -0.160** 
  (0.077) 
IL sometimes # Initially overskilled  0.114 
  (0.080) 
IL usually # Initially underskilled  -0.151** 
  (0.075) 
IL usually # Initially overskilled  0.217*** 
  (0.080) 
IL always # Initially underskilled  -0.170** 
  (0.081) 
IL always # Initially overskilled  0.218** 
  (0.091) 
Formal education # Initially underskilled  -0.024 
  (0.033) 
Formal education # Initially overskilled  0.103
**
 
  (0.044) 
Age  -0.007
***
 -0.007
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.209
***
 0.209
***
 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Intermediate level of education -0.077
***
 -0.073
***
 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
High level of education -0.213
***
 -0.209
***
 
 (0.029) (0.030) 
Years of tenure 0.016
***
 0.016
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
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Other controls yes yes 
cut1 -2.598*** (0.084) -2.635*** (0.088) 
cut2 -2.256*** (0.076) -2.292*** (0.081) 
cut3 -1.939*** (0.073) -1.975*** (0.078) 
cut4 -1.658*** (0.071) -1.694*** (0.076) 
cut5 -1.392*** (0.070) -1.427*** (0.076) 
cut6 -0.484*** (0.069) -0.517*** (0.075) 
cut7 -0.142**   (0.068) -0.155**   (0.075) 
cut8  0.476*** (0.069)  0.444*** (0.074) 
cut9  1.222*** (0.070)  1.191*** (0.075) 
cut10  1.801*** (0.070)  1.769*** (0.075) 
Pseudo R2 0.0701 0.0709 
BIC-stat (27) 127,204.9 127,147.8 
LR chi2 (10)  37.13 (0.0001) 
Specification (1) gives the coefficients of the regression without interacting the learning variables and the 
workers’ skill mismatch status, and specification (2) includes these interactions. The dependent variable skill 
change is measured from categories zero to 10 (0= skills have worsened a lot, 5= skills have stayed the same, 
10= skills have improved a lot). Other controls include dummies for changes in job-position and/or task 
content, the working process and the need of learning new things since the start of the job as well as dummies 
for type of contract, occupation, industry, firm size, country and survey answered by phone. Standard errors 
clustered at country level are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N = 37,285. 
 
Table A4. Estimations of training and informal learning participation  
 (1) (2) (4) 
 Probit AME 
Training  
Probit AME 
IL 
OLS  
IL intensity 
Initially underskilled 0.068*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.012) 
Initially overskilled -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.094*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.017) 
Age  -0.005** -0.001** -0.010** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age2 *100 0.007** 0.003** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Female -0.007 0.001 -0.017 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.016) 
Intermediate level of education 0.051*** 0.008 0.077** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.036) 
High level of education 0.089*** 0.020*** 0.124*** 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.036) 
Years of tenure 0.009*** -0.001*** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Temporary contract -0.083*** 0.013* 0.082*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) 
Agency contract -0.154*** 0.034*** 0.122** 
 (0.039) (0.012) (0.056) 
No formal contract -0.166*** 0.001 0.035 
 (0.023) (0.008) (0.046) 
Learning attitude (std) 0.022*** -0.002 0.147*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) 
Other controls yes yes yes 
Columns (1) and (2) in this table show AMEs computed based on probit regressions. Column (3) reports OLS 
coefficients. Other controls include occupation, industry, firm size and country dummies. The AME for 
categorical variables is the discrete change from the base level. Standard errors clustered at country level are 
shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  N= 37,285. 
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Table A5. AMEs of work-related learning on workers’ skill development  
Skill change 0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 
A. All employees     
Training -0.019
***
 -0.046
***
 -0.007
***
 0.072
***
 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) 
IL (dummy) -0.015
***
 -0.053
***
 -0.021
***
 0.091
***
 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) 
B. AMEs within the same initial job–skill (mis)match group 
Initially well-matched     
Training  -0.013
***
 -0.046
***
 -0.014
***
 0.073
***
 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) 
IL (dummy) -0.013*** -0.054*** -0.023*** 0.090*** 
  
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) 
Initially underskilled    
Training  -0.007
***
 -0.043
***
 -0.018
***
 0.068
***
 
  (0.001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) 
IL (dummy) -0.014** -0.038** -0.004* 0.056** 
 (0.006) (0.016) (0.002) (0.025) 
Initially overskilled    
Training -0.018
***
 -0.054
***
 -0.005
**
 0.077
***
 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) 
IL (dummy) -0.043*** -0.064*** 0.008 0.099*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) 
This table shows the AMEs computed on an ordered probit specification similar to column (2) in 
Table A3 that includes a dummy variable for IL instead of the original categorical variable. The 
dependent variable skill change is measured by 11 ordinal categories from zero to 10 (0= skills 
have worsened a lot, 5= skills have stayed the same, 10= skills have improved a lot). AMEs on 
skill change are grouped into four categories: worsened (0-4), no or hardly any change (5-6), 
intermediate improvement (7-8), and high improvement (9-10). The AME for categorical 
variables is the discrete change from the base level. Standard errors clustered at country level are 
shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N = 37,285. 
 
 
Table A6. Training (probit) estimations                                                                                             
including informal learning as explanatory variable   
Training Probit AMEs 
A. Initially well matched   
IL sometimes 0.173*** 
 (0.022) 
IL usually 0.233*** 
 (0.024) 
IL always 0.259*** 
 (0.030) 
B. AMEs between the initial job–skill (mis)match                          
groups (well matched ref.) 
Initially underskilled   
IL sometimes 0.074*** 
  (0.011) 
IL usually 0.064*** 
  (0.009) 
IL always 0.046*** 
 (0.010) 
Initially overskilled  
IL sometimes -0.010 
  (0.007) 
IL usually 0.006 
  (0.010) 
IL always -0.017 
 (0.012) 
All other controls are included. The AME for categorical 
variables is the discrete change from the base level. 
Standard errors clustered at country level are shown in 
parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. N= 37,187. 
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Table A7. Informal learning (oprobit) estimations                                                                                             
including training as explanatory variable   
Informal learning Never Sometimes Usually Always 
A. Initially well matched    
Training  -0.017*** -0.072*** 0.024*** 0.065*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) 
B. AME between the initial job–skill (mis)match groups (well matched ref.) 
Initially underskilled     
Training -0.002 -0.008 0.002 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) 
Initially overskilled     
Training  0.005*** 0.026*** -0.006*** -0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) 
All other controls are included. The AME for categorical variables is the discrete change from the 
base level. Standard errors clustered at country level are shown in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,                  
***p < 0.01.  N= 37,187. 
 
 
Figure A1. AMEs of work-related learning on workers’ skill development (cat. 9-10)                                         
within job–skill (mis)match groups over years of tenure 
 
 
 
Figure A2. AMEs of work-related learning on workers’ skill development (cat. 9-10)                        
between job–skill (mis)match groups over years of tenure 
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